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explanation:	to	explain	that	Y	causes	X	was	tantamount	to	constructing	a	mechanical	model	of	how	Y	brings	about	X.	The	model	was	mechanical	insofar	as	it	was	based	on	resources	licensed	by	the	metaphysical	worldview,	viz.,	action	of	particles	by	contact	in	virtue	of	their	primary	qualities	and	subject	to	laws	of	motion.1	Nearly	four	centuries	later,	the	mechanical	worldview	has	become	prominent	again	within	philosophy	of	science.	It’s	become	known	as	‘the	New	Mechanical	Philosophy’	and	has	similar	aspirations	as	the	old	one.	New	Mechanism,	as	Stuart	Glennan	puts	it,			 says	of	nature	that	most	or	all	the	phenomena	found	in	nature	depend	on	mechanisms—collections	of	entities	whose	activities	and	interactions,	suitably	organized,	are	responsible	for	these	phenomena.	It	says	of	science	that	its	chief	business	is	the	construction	of	models	that	describe,	predict,	and	explain	these	mechanism-dependent	phenomena	(2017,	1).			So,	New	Mechanism	too	is	both	a	view	about	science	and	about	the	metaphysics	of	nature.	And	yet,	in	New	Mechanism	the	primary	focus	has	been	on	scientific	practice,	and	in	particular	on	the	use	of	mechanisms	in	discovery,	reasoning	and	representation	(cf.	Glennan	2017,	12).	The	focus	on	the	metaphysics	of	mechanisms	has	emerged	as	an	attempt	to	draw	conclusions	about	the	ontic	signature	of	the	world	starting	from	the	concept	of	mechanism	as	it	is	used	in	the	sciences.	According	to	Glennan,	as	the	research	into	the	use	of	mechanism	in	science	developed,	“it	has	been	clear	to	many	participants	in	the	discussion	that	metaphysical	questions	are	unavoidable”	(2017,	12).	It	is	fair	to	say	that	New	Mechanism	aims	to	ground	the	metaphysics	of	mechanisms	on	the	practice	of	mechanical	explanation	in	the	sciences. The	chief	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	discuss	the	relation	between	the	metaphysics	of	mechanisms	and	the	role	of	mechanical	explanation	in	the	practice	of	science.	It	will	do	that	by	presenting	and	comparing	the	key	tenets	of		Old	and	New	Mechanism.	Section	2	will	be	devoted	to	the	seventeenth	century	Mechanism.	It	will	present	the	basic	contours	of	the	mechanistic	metaphysics	and	show	how	it	constrained	scientific	explanation,	focusing	on	the	case	of	gravity.	In	this	section,	we	will	also	discuss	Isaac	Newton’s	critique	of	mechanism	and	highlight	the	significance	of	his	key	thought,	viz.,	that	causal	explanation	should	identify	the	causes	and	the	laws	that	govern	their	action,	irrespective	of	whether	or	not	these	causes	can	be	taken	to	satisfy	certain	(mostly	metaphysically	driven)	constraints,	such	as	being	modelled	in	terms	of	configurations	of	matter	in	motion.	Section	3	will	focus	on	the	current	mechanistic	metaphysics	and	show	that	it	is	not	warranted	by	the	use	of	the	concept	of	mechanism	in	scientific	practice.	It	will	show	that	the	currently	popular	minimal	general	characterisation	of	a	mechanism	is	still	metaphysically	inflated	in	various	ways	and	will	motivate	a	thin	conception	of	mechanism,	which	is	not	committed	to	any	views	about	the	ontological	signature	of	mechanism.	This	thin	conception—what	we	call	‘truly	minimal	mechanism’—











                                                2	In	(IV,	204;	1982,	286)	Descartes	accepts	that	scientific	explanation	does	not	require	the	truth	of	the	claims	about	the	microconstituents	of	things.	In	the	next	paragraph,	however,	he	argues	that	his	explanations	have	‘moral	certainty’	(IV,	205;	1982,	286-7).	
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	Given	the	continuity	thesis,	we	can	transfer	this	mechanical	model	to	the	motion	of	the	planets	and	“imagine	that	all	the	same	things	happen	to	the	Planets;	and	this	is	all	we	need	to	explain	all	their	remaining	phenomena”	(op.cit.).	Notably,	the	continuity	thesis	offers	a	heuristic	for	discovering	plausible	mechanical	explanations.			 Christiaan	Huygens	(1690)	came	to	doubt	the	vortex	theory	“which	formerly	appeared	very	likely”	to	him	(1997,	32).	He	didn’t	thereby	abandon	the	key	tenet	of	mechanical	philosophy.	For	Huygens	too	the	causal	explanation	of	a	natural	phenomenon	had	to	be	mechanical.	He	said	referring	to	Descartes:			 Mr	Descartes	has	recognized,	better	than	those	that	preceded	him,	that	nothing	will	be	ever	understood	in	physics	except	what	can	be	made	to	depend	on	principles	that	do	not	exceed	the	reach	of	our	spirit,	such	as	those	that	depend	on	bodies,	deprived	of	qualities,	and	their	motions	(1997,	1-2).			Huygens	posited	a	fluid	matter	that	consists	of	very	small	parts	in	rapid	motion	in	all	directions	and	which	fills	the	spherical	space	that	includes	all	heavenly	bodies.	Since	there	is	no	empty	space,	this	fluid	matter	is	more	easily	moved	in	circular	motion	around	the	centre,	but	not	all	parts	of	it	move	in	the	same	direction.	As	Huygens	put	it	“it	is	not	difficult	now	to	explain	how	gravity	is	produced	by	this	motion”	(1997,	16).	When	the	parts	of	the	fluid	matter	encounter	some	bigger	bodies,	like	the	planets:	“these	bodies	[the	planets]	will	necessarily	be	pushed	towards	the	center	of	motion,	since	they	do	not	follow	the	rapid	motion	of	the	aforementioned	matter”	(op.cit.).	And	he	added:			 This	then	is	in	all	likelihood	what	the	gravity	of	bodies	truly	consists	of:	we	can	say	that	this	is	the	endeavor	that	causes	the	fluid	matter,	which	turns	circularly	around	the	center	of	the	Earth	in	all	directions,	to	move	away	from	the	center	and	to	push	in	its	place	bodies	that	do	not	follow	this	motion	(op.cit).		In	fact,	Huygens	devised	an	experiment	with	bits	of	beeswax	to	show	how	this	movement	towards	the	centre	can	take	place.			 Newton	of	course	challenged	all	this,	and	along	the	lines,	the	very	idea	that	causal	explanation	should	be	mechanical.	But	before	we	take	a	look	at	his	reasons	and	their	importance	for	the	very	idea	of	scientific	explanation,	we	should	not	fail	to	see	the	broader	metaphysical	grounding	of	the	mechanical	project.	For,	as	we	noted,	in	the	seventeenth	century	Mechanism	offered	the	metaphysical	foundation	of	science.		
2.2	Mechanical	vs	Non-Mechanical	Explanation	The	contours	of	this	endeavour	are	well-known.	Matter	and	motion	are	the	‘ultimate	constituents’	of	nature;	or,	as	Robert	Boyle	(1991,	20)	put	it,	the	“two	grand	and	most	catholic	principles	of	bodies”.	Hence,	all	there	is	in	nature	(but	clearly	not	the	Cartesian	minds)	is	determined	(caused)	by	the	mechanical	affections	of	bodies	and	the	mechanical	laws.	Here	is	Boyle	again:			 [T]he	universe	being	once	framed	by	God,	and	the	laws	of	motion	being	settled	and	all	upheld	by	his	incessant	concourse	and	general	providence,	the	phenomena	of	the	world	thus	constituted	are	physically	produced	by	the	mechanical	affections	of	the	parts	of	
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to	be	derived	from	the	simplest	possible	principles”,	but	unlike	the	mechanists’s	way,	it	“assume(s)	nothing	as	a	principle	that	has	not	yet	been	thoroughly	proved	from	phenomena”.	The	“explication	of	the	system	of	the	world	most	successfully	deduced	from	the	theory	of	gravity”	is	the	“most	illustrious”	example	of	Newton’s	way	(2004,	32).			 Newton	emphatically	denied	feigning	any	hypotheses	about	the	cause	of	gravity.	For	him,			 it	is	enough	that	gravity	really	exists	and	acts	according	to	the	laws	that	we	have	set	forth	and	is	sufficient	to	explain	all	the	motions	of	the	heavenly	bodies	and	of	our	sea	(2004,	92).			Gravity	according	to	Newton	is	a	non-mechanical	force	since	it		 operates	not	according	to	the	quantity	of	the	surfaces	of	the	particles	upon	which	it	acts	(as	mechanical	causes	used	to	do),	but	according	to	the	quantity	of	the	solid	matter	which	they	contain,	and	propagates	its	virtue	on	all	sides	to	immense	distances,	decreasing	always	as	the	inverse	square	of	the	distances	(op.cit.).			He	added	that	the	very	motion	of	the	comets	makes	it	plausible	to	think	that	the	regular	elliptical	motion	of	the	planets	(as	well	as	of	their	satellites)	cannot	“have	their	origin	in	mechanical	causes”	(2004,	90).	In	his	already	mentioned	Discourse	on	the	Cause	of	Gravity	(1690),	Huygens	expressed	his	dissatisfaction	with	Newton’s	failure	to	offer	a	mechanical	explanation	of	the	cause	of	gravitational	attraction.	Favouring	his	own	explanation	of	gravity	in	terms	of	the	centrifugal	force	of	the	subtle	and	rapidly	moving	matter	that	fills	the	space	around	the	Earth	and	the	other	planets,	Huygens	noted	that	Newton’s	theory	supposes	that	gravity	is	“an	inherent	quality	of	corporeal	matter”.	“But”,	he	immediately	added,	such	a	hypothesis	“would	distance	us	a	great	deal	from	mathematical	or	mechanical	principles”	(1997,	35).	Yet	Huygens	had	no	difficulty	in	granting	that	Newton’s	law	of	gravity	was	essentially	correct	when	it	comes	to	accounting	for	the	planetary	system.	As	he	put	it:			 I	have	nothing	against	Vis	Centripeta,	as	Mr.	Newton	calls	it,	which	causes	the	planets	to	weigh	(or	gravitate)	toward	the	Sun,	and	the	Moon	toward	the	Earth,	but	here	I	remain	in	agreement	without	difficulty	because	not	only	do	we	know	through	experience	that	there	is	such	a	manner	of	attraction	or	impulse	in	nature,	but	also	that	it	is	explained	by	the	laws	of	motion,	as	we	have	seen	in	what	I	wrote	above	on	gravity	(1997,	31).			Explaining	the	fact	that	gravity	depends	on	the	masses	and	diminishes	with	distance	“in	inverse	proportion	to	the	squares	of	the	distances	from	the	centre”	(1997,	37),	were,	for	Huygens,	clear	achievements	of	Newton’s	theory	despite	the	fact	that	the	mechanical	cause	of	gravity	remained	unidentified.			 Commitment	to	mechanical	explanation	was	honoured	by	Gottfried	Wilhelm	Leibniz	too.	In	a	piece	titled	“Against	Barbaric	Physics:	Toward	a	Philosophy	of	What	There	Actually	Is	and	Against	the	Revival	of	the	Qualities	of	the	Scholastics	and	Chimerical	Intelligences”	(written	between	1710	and	1716),	he	defended	the	mechanical	view	by	arguing	that	corporeal	forces	should	be	grounded	mechanically	when	it	comes	to	their	application	to	the	natural	world.	
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Leibniz	was	very	clear	that	though	he	allowed	“magnetic,	elastic,	and	other	sorts	of	forces”,	they	are	permissible	“only	insofar	as	we	understand	that	they	are	not	primitive	or	incapable	of	being	explained,	but	arise	from	motions	and	shapes”	(Leibniz	1989,	313).	So,	forces	are	necessary,	but	a	condition	for	their	applicability	to	the	natural	world	is	that	they	are	seen	as	“arising	from	motions	and	shapes”.	What	he	took	it	to	be	“barbarism	in	physics”	was	to	posit	sui	





                                                3	For	more	on	the	development	of	Old	Mechanism,	see	Psillos	(2011).	
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this	concept	and	then	to	derive	metaphysical	conclusions,	i.e.	conclusions	about	the	(mechanistic)	structure	of	the	world.		 This	kind	of	bottom-up	inquiry	has	yielded	several	well-known	general	accounts	of	mechanisms	as	well	as	theses	about	the	ontic	signature	of	a	mechanistic	world.		
3.1	The	Metaphysics	of	New	Mechanism	Here	are	three	well-known	general	characterisations	of	a	mechanism	in	recent	mechanistic	literature:		 Mechanisms	are	entities	and	activities	organized	such	that	they	are	productive	of	regular	changes	from	start	or	set-up	to	finish	or	termination	conditions	(Machamer,	Darden,	&	Craver	2000,	3).		A	mechanism	for	a	behavior	is	a	complex	system	that	produces	that	behavior	by	the	interaction	of	a	number	of	parts,	where	the	interactions	between	parts	can	be	characterized	by	direct,	invariant,	change-relating	generalizations	(Glennan	2002,	S344).		A	mechanism	is	a	structure	performing	a	function	in	virtue	of	its	component	parts,	component	operations,	and	their	organization.	The	orchestrated	functioning	of	the	mechanism	is	responsible	for	one	or	more	phenomena	(Bechtel	&	Abrahamsen	2005,	423). 	The	focus	on	mechanism	as	a	concept-in-use	is	common	to	all	three	accounts;	none	of	the	three	accounts	can	be	viewed	as	falling	under	the	rubric	of	mechanistic	theories	of	causation.	And	yet,	all	these	and	similar	accounts	yield	specific	metaphysical	commitments	about	what	kind	of	things	in	the	world	mechanisms	are.	All	these	accounts	are	committed	to	the	thesis	that	a	general	characterisation	of	mechanism	must	itself	be	cashed	out	in	metaphysical	terms.	Hence,	talk	of	mechanisms	in	science	is	taken	to	have	quite	direct	consequences	about	the	kind	of	ontology	presupposed	by	such	talk.	In	order	to	substantiate	this	point,	let	us	look	at	the	three	accounts	mentioned	earlier	in	some	more	detail.			 Peter	Machamer,	Lindley	Darden	and	Carl	Craver’s	(MDC)	account	is	perhaps	the	most	ontologically	inflated,	as	it	is	explicitly	committed	to	both	entities	and	activities	as	distinct	and	separate	ontological	categories.	It	is	thus	committed	to	a	particular	view	about	the	metaphysics	of	causation:	causation	within	mechanisms	is	to	be	characterised	in	terms	of	production,	where	the	productive	relation	is	captured	by	the	various	different	kinds	of	activities	identified	by	science.		 Glennan’s	case	is	interesting,	since	in	his	(2002)	he	refrains	from	taking	mechanisms	to	entail	a	productive	account	of	causation.	Instead,	within-mechanism	interactions	are	characterised	in	terms	of	invariant,	change-relating	generalisations.	As	we	will	see	below,	however,	Glennan	has	presently	connected	his	account	of	mechanisms	with	a	power-based	understanding	of	causation.	Hence,	he	is	committed	to	causal	powers	as	parts	of	the	building	blocks	of	mechanisms.		 Lastly,	William	Bechtel	&	Adele	Abrahamsen’s	account	does	not	include	a	specific	characterisation	of	what	mechanistic	causation	amounts	to	at	all.	Here,	however,	as	in	the	other	two	accounts,	we	have	a	series	of	general	terms	the	meaning	of	which	needs	to	be	unpacked.	So,	MDC	include	in	their	accounts	
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‘entities’	and	‘organisation’;	Glennan	includes	‘complex	system’	and	‘parts’;	and	Bechtel	&	Abrahamsen	talk	about	‘structure’,	‘function’,	‘parts’	and	‘organisation’.			 All	these	accounts	suggest	the	further	need	to	explain	what	this	‘new	mechanical	ontology’	of	entities,	activities,	organisation	of	parts	into	wholes	etc.	amounts	to:	what,	in	general	terms,	the	constituents	of	mechanisms	are	and	what	are	their	relations	with	more	traditional	metaphysical	categories,	such	as	things,	properties,	powers	and	processes.		 Notably,	there	has	been	a	tendency	recently	to	offer	a	more	minimal	general	characterisation	of	a	mechanism.	For	example,	according	to	Phyllis	Illari	&	Jon	Williamson:		 A	mechanism	for	a	phenomenon	consists	of	entities	and	activities	organized	in	such	a	way	that	they	are	responsible	for	the	phenomenon	(2012,	120).		Glennan’s	recent	version	is	almost	identical:			 A	mechanism	for	a	phenomenon	consists	of	entities	(or	parts)	whose	activities	and	interactions	are	organised	so	as	to	be	responsible	for	the	phenomenon	(2017,	17).		Glennan	calls	this	account	Minimal	Mechanism.	The	key	motivation	here	is	for	a	general	characterisation	of	mechanism	broad	enough	to	capture	examples	of	mechanisms	in	different	fields,	from	physics	to	the	social	sciences.	But	even	in	this	minimal	mode,	mechanisms,	according	to	Glennan,	“constitute	the	causal	structure	of	the	world”	(Glennan	2017,	18).		 This	minimal	account	of	mechanism	might	appear	to	fit	the	bill	of	capturing	a	concept-in-use	in	science.	On	closer	inspection,	however,	it	is	committed	to	a	rather	rich	metaphysical	account	of	mechanism:	the	minimal	account	is	not	more	minimal	than	the	metaphysically	inflated	accounts	noted	above.	The	reason	is	that	both	of	the	foregoing	minimal	accounts	still	invite	questions	about	the	ontic	status	of	mechanisms.	For	example:	how	exactly	do	entities	and	activities	differ?	What	is	the	relation	between	activities	and	interactions?	How	should	organisation	be	understood?	Glennan	(2017,	13)	explicitly	talks	about	a	“new	mechanical	ontology”	as	the	upshot	of	the	minimal	account.	The	“minimal	mechanism”,	he	adds,	“is	an	ontological	characterization	of	what	mechanisms	are	as	things	in	the	world”	(2017,	19).			 New	Mechanism,	then,	aims	to	provide	a	new	ontology	of	mechanisms.	We	can	identify	three	commonly	accepted	key	theses	concerning	mechanistic	ontology:		(1) The	world	consists	of	mechanisms.			Thesis	1	is	a	typical	view	among	mechanists:	mechanisms	are	taken	to	be	things	
in	the	world,	with	objective	boundaries.	Ours	is	a	mechanistic	world.	As	Glennan	puts	it	at	the	end	of	his	(2017,	240),	“[t]hat	is	just	how	we	have	found	the	world	to	be”.		(2) A	mechanism	consists	of	objects	of	diverse	kinds	and	sizes	structured	in	such	a	way	that,	in	virtue	of	their	properties	and	capacities,	engage	in	a	variety	of	different	kinds	of	activities	and	interactions	such	that	a	certain	phenomenon	P	is	brought	about.			
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connects	them	and	accounts	for	the	specific	way	that	the	cause	brings	about	the	effect.	Also,	scientists	succeed	in	identifying	a	mechanism,	if	they	succeed	in	describing	the	relevant	causal	pathway	in	terms	of	the	theoretical	language	of	the	particular	scientific	field.			 In	life	sciences,	this	is	a	typical	use	of	‘mechanism’.	In	our	(2017),	we	have	discussed	extensively	a	particular	example,	the	case	of	apoptosis,	i.e.	a	particular	causal	pathway	(or	mechanism)	of	cell	death.	The	study	of	apoptosis	(and	of	mechanisms	of	programmed	and	physiological	cell	death	in	general)	in	fact	transcends	particular	biological	fields,	and	has	involved	cytologists,	developmental	biologists,	pathologists,	and	molecular	biologists	among	others.	Because	of	its	broad	role,	this	case	offers	a	nice	test	case	of	the	concept	of	mechanism	as	it	is	used	in	science.	Apoptosis	is	described	in	various	biological	disciplines	as	a	‘mechanism’	of	cell	death.	The	common	concept	of	mechanism	at	play	here,	we	have	argued	in	(2017),	is	that	a	mechanism	just	is	a	causal	pathway.	TMM	then	is	the	common	denominator	of	all	uses	of	the	concept	of	mechanism	in	biology	and	elsewhere.		 To	further	see	the	plausibility	of	this	view,	consider	the	relation	between	the	concepts	of	mechanism	and	function.	In	the	general	accounts	mentioned	earlier,	only	Bechtel	&	Abrahamsen	explicitly	refer	to	the	behaviour	of	a	mechanism	in	terms	of	its	function.	But	in	all	accounts,	a	mechanism	is	always	a	mechanism	for	a	phenomenon	or	behaviour,	and	this	can	be	taken	as	an	implicit	reference	to	the	function	of	the	mechanism,	which	plays	a	central	role	in	individuating	the	mechanism.	In	other	words,	there	is	no	mechanism	without	a	function,	and	the	function	determines	what,	among	everything	that	happens	within	a	complex	system	such	as	an	organism,	counts	as	a	mechanism.	It	is	an	open	issue	among	new	mechanists	how	this	commitment	to	function	should	be	construed	and	what	its	consequences	for	the	metaphysics	of	mechanisms	are	(cf.	Garson	2018;	Craver	2013).		 However,	if	we	insist	on	an	account	of	mechanism	broad	enough	to	capture	all	uses	of	the	concept	in	science,	and	given	that	there	are	scientific	fields	where	the	concept	of	function	is	not	present	(e.g.	particle	physics,	solid	state	physics,	astrophysics,	cosmology),	an	account	such	as	TMM	seems	preferable.	Of	course,	there	are	contexts	(for	example,	in	molecular	biology),	where	a	mechanism	is	automatically	a	mechanism	for	a	certain	function;	e.g.	apoptosis	is	a	mechanism	for	cell	death,	and	it	also	has	a	homeostatic	function	within	the	organism	(see	our	(2017)	for	more	on	this	point	and	its	relevance	for	TMM).	But	it	is	not	clear	that	a	mechanism	of	star	formation,	for	example,	has	star	formation	as	its	function,	unless	one	takes	function	to	be	what	the	mechanism	produces,	i.e.	its	effect.	The	point	here	is	that	if	we	want	to	claim	that	a	mechanism	of	cell	death	and	a	mechanism	of	star	formation	are	in	some	sense	the	same	kind	of	thing	(i.e.	they	are	both	mechanisms),	that	is	if	we	want	to	give	a	general	account	of	a	mechanism	as	a	concept-in-use	across	various	scientific	fields,	TMM	seems	the	most	promising	candidate.	At	the	same	time,	TMM	can	be	easily	adapted	to	capture	particular	uses	of	‘mechanism’	in	various	contexts	where	a	specific	notion	of	function	is	presupposed.		 We	want	to	resist	the	temptation	to	offer	a	metaphysically	inflated	account	of	the	causal	pathway,	in	terms	of	an	explicit	specification	of	its	ontological	constituents.	A	key	reason	for	this	is	that	the	causal	pathway	should	be	described	in	the	theoretical	language	of	a	specific	scientific	field,	and	not	in	
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some	privileged	ontological	language	or	even	in	ontologically	loaded	terms.	This	suggests	that	the	form	of	the	description	of	the	mechanism	cannot	be	decided	beforehand	and	in	advance	of	how	the	concept	of	mechanism	is	used.	What	counts,	each	time,	as	a	legitimate	description	of	a	causal	pathway,	is	something	that	has	to	be	decided	by	scientific	practice.	Instead	of	imposing	various	metaphysical	categories	as	those	that	constitute	a	general	legitimate	description	of	a	mechanism,	it	should	be	left	to	the	scientists	themselves	to	decide	how	best	to	describe	mechanisms	using	the	theoretical	language	they	employ	to	understand	and	describe	the	world.	TMM	has	the	consequence	that	a	series	of	questions	that	new	mechanists	have	been	concerned	with	need	not	concern	us	if	our	aim	is	to	understand	scientific	practice.4		 If	we	identify	a	mechanism	with	a	causal	pathway,	would	it	be	required	to	make	a	commitment	about	what	the	ontological	nature	of	causation	is?	This	does	not	seem	necessary	for	understanding	the	concept-in-use.	Scientific	practice	establishes	robust	causal	connections,	which	can	be	used	for	understanding	and	manipulation,	without	necessarily	being	committed	to	a	single	and	overarching	ontic	account	of	causation.	Ultimately,	whatever	fundamental	ontological	theory	of	what	causation	is	one	might	have	(e.g.	in	terms	of	causal	powers	or	regularities	etc.),	the	identification	of	causal	relationships	is	based	on	theory-described	difference-making	relations;	this	is	what	scientists	look	for	when	establishing	causal	relations	and	causal	pathways.	In	this	sense,	the	causal	pathway	by	means	of	which	a	phenomenon	Y	is	brought	about	by	a	cause	X,	given	that	X	initiates	a	chain	of	events	that	leads	to	Y,	is	the	very	network	of	theory-described	difference-making	relations	among	the	various	intermediaries	of	X	and	Y.	It	is	a	further	question,	and	one	that	is	not	needed	to	be	answered	in	order	to	discover	and	use	causal	relations	in	scientific	practice,	what	the	truth-makers	of	these	difference-making	relations	are.	Hence,	the	point	here	is	that	in	order	to	understand	what	a	causal	pathway	(and	hence	a	mechanism)	as	a	concept-in-use	is,	and	to	identify	mechanisms,	we	do	not	need	a	theory	about	the	metaphysics	of	causation:	TMM	is	really,	ontologically	speaking,	a	truly	minimal	view5.			 TMM	is	best	seen	in	the	context	of	a	thesis	that	we	call,	following	Joseph	Henry	Woodger	(1929)	and	Robert	Brandon	(1984),	Methodological	Mechanism	[MM]	(see	our	(2017)	for	more	on	Woodger	on	MM).	In	his	(1929),	Woodger	distinguished	between	two	ways	in	which	a	certain	notion	can	be	employed:	a	metaphysical	or	ontological	way	and	a	methodological	one.	The	latter	is	when	a	notion	is	used	for	the	purposes	of	description	‘‘independently	of	its	metaphysical	interpretation’’.	In	this	case,	Woodger	says,	the	notion	‘‘is	employed	methodologically,	i.e.	simply	for	the	purpose	of	investigation’’	(1929,	31).	The	advantage	of	this	use	is	that	the	notion	can	be	used	in	a	certain	practice	and	cast	light	on	it	independently	of	whatever	difficulties	(and	controversies)	are	raised	






explanation	matters,	it	doesn’t	matter	if	it	is	subject	to	various	(old)	mechanical	constraints.			 We	noted	already	that	the	new	mechanical	conception	of	nature	is	far	from	the	seventeenth	century	conception	that	everything	should	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	(configurations	of)	matter	in	motion.	So	it’s	far	from	us	to	tar	New	Mechanism	with	the	same	brush	as	Old	Mechanism.	For	instance,	the	key	ontology	of	the	old	mechanical	picture	was	justified,	by	and	large	a	priori,	whereas	the	key	ontology	of	New	Mechanism	is	grounded	in	scientific	practice;	in	this	case,	it	is	practice	that	constrains	metaphysics.	Be	that	as	it	may,	we	are	now	going	to	argue	that	there	exists	a	kind	of	Newtonian	move	against	New	Mechanism	too.	What	is	clear	from	the	present	discussion	is	that,	regardless	of	the	main	difference	noted	above,	the	new	idea	of	mechanism	is	no	less	metaphysically	loaded	than	the	old	one.	Where	the	seventeenth	century	mechanists	looked	for	stable	arrangements	of	matter	in	motion	subject	to	laws,	the	twenty-first	century	mechanists	look	for	stable	arrangements	of	powerful	entities	engaged	in	various	activities	and	interactions.	These	mechanisms	are	supposed	to	be	the	building	blocks	of	nature	and	the	scientific	task	is	to	unravel	them.	They	underpin	“mechanistic	explanations”	which,	as	Glennan	put	it,	show	“how	the	organized	activities	and	interactions	of	some	set	of	entities	cause	and	constitute	the	phenomenon	to	be	explained”	(2017,	223).	Mechanistic	explanation	“always	involves	characterizing	the	activities	and	interactions	of	a	mechanism’s	parts”	(2017,	223).	Where	the	seventeenth	century	mechanists	saw	‘action	by	contact’	as	a	requisite	for	a	proper	mechanical	explanation,	new	mechanists	see	powers	and	‘activities’.			 Why	is	Newton’s	key	thought	relevant	to	the	modern	debates	about	mechanisms?	The	key	thought,	to	repeat,	was	that	causal	explanation	should	identify	causes	and	the	laws	that	govern	their	action	irrespective	of	whether	or	not	these	causes	can	be	taken	to	satisfy	further	(mostly	metaphysically	driven)	constraints.	In	other	words,	Newton	showed	that	certain	causal	explanations	of	phenomena	(in	terms	of	non-mechanical	forces)	are	both	legitimate	and	complete	insofar	as	they	identify	the	right	causes	and	are	empirically	grounded.		 We	take	it	that	the	point	MM	stresses,	is,	mutatis	mutandis,	analogous	to	Newton’s.	The	point	of	MM	is	that	causal	explanation	need	not	be	mechanistic	in	the	new	mechanists’	ontic	sense,	and	that	being	couched	in	the	way	new	mechanists	propose,	causal	explanation	is	subjected	to	constraints	unwarranted	by	scientific	practice.	Insofar	as	mechanism	is	a	concept-in-use	in	science,	it	may	well	be	seen	referring	to	the	causal	pathway	of	the	phenomenon	to	be	explained,	couched	in	the	language	of	theories.	Preserving	the	spirit	of	Newton’s	key	thought,	we	might	say	that	causal	explanation	is	legitimate	even	if	we	bracket	the	issue	of	“what	mechanisms	or	causes	are	as	things	in	the	world”	(Glennan	2017,	12)	or	the	issue	of	what	activities	are	and	how	they	are	related	to	powers	and	the	like.	The	issue	then	is	not	“an	ontological	characterization	of	what	mechanisms	are	as	things	in	the	world”	(2017,	19),	but	a	methodological	characterisation	of	them	as	causal	pathways	described	in	the	language	of	theories.	To	press	the	analogy	a	bit	more,	questions	such	as:		 If	entities,	activities,	and	the	mechanisms	they	constitute	are	compounds,	of	what	are	they	compounded?	Where	does	one	entity	or	activity	or	mechanism	end,	and	when	does	
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another	begin?	And	on	what	account	do	we	decide	that	a	collection	of	interacting	entities	is	to	count	as	a	whole	mechanism?	(Glennan	2017,	29)		are	pretty	much	like	the	questions	concerning	the	cause	of	the	properties	of	gravity	that	Newton	thought	need	not	be	asked	and	answered	for	a	scientifically	legitimate	conception	of	causal	explanation.		We	don’t	want	to	claim	that	questions	such	as	the	above	are	not	connected	to	scientific	practice.	After	all,	even	the	question	of	the	cause	of	gravity	that	Newton	refrained	from	answering,	was	connected	to	scientific	practice.	The	point,	rather,	we	take	from	Newton	is	that	answering	these	questions	is	not	required	for	offering	adequate	causal	explanations	of	the	phenomena	under	study.	Similarly,,	for	MM,	answering	questions	such	as	the	above	is	not	required	in	order	to	have	legitimate	mechanistic	explanations.	In	other	words,	the	properties	of	mechanism	over	and	above	those	that	are	required	by	its	methodological	use	need	not	be	specified;	nor	is	there	an	explanatory	lacuna	if	they	are	not.		According	to	MM,	the	concept	of	mechanism	as	used	in	practice	need	not,	and	should	not,	be	understood	in	a	metaphysically	inflated	sense.	Hence,	new	mechanists,	in	offering	such	metaphysically	inflated	accounts,	need	to	show	that	such	accounts	are	indeed	indispensable	for	doing	good	mechanistic	science.		To	conclude,	as	Newton	remained	agnostic	about	the	underlying	mechanism	of	gravity,	so	MM	remains	agnostic	about	the	metaphysical	ground	of	any	particular	causal	pathway.	As	in	the	case	of	gravity,	it	is	enough	that	
mechanisms	qua	causal	pathways	really	exist	and	act	as	they	do.		
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